


The following text comes from emails sent between some pilots who
sent these photos to each other. I am including the text
here as it is interesting although it is the opinion of the writers
only and does not reflect any official finding that I know of.
Still it is very interesting ----Ed DeChant
The emails:
Got this from a friend, thought it
interesting. Included are some shots of the F-16s that went up to
see what was going on. Sad to think that when the pictures were
taken all on the plane were either already dead, or about to be.
I just can not believe 2 pilots would make so
many fatal mistakes.
Notice the sequence of events that caused
this plane to eventually crash near Athens on August 14th. The
plane was a 737-300 and was in LNAV (lateral Navigation) VNAV
(Vertical Navigation) and the altitude alerter was sent to 34000.
The autopilot performed as it was supposed to until the electrical
power failed due to fuel starvation. The pilots and everyone else
were unconscious and I presume dead by the time this all happened
and the plane entered a graveyard spiral and quickly
thereafter impacted the planet Earth in Greece.
The two pilots ignored the cabin altitude warning
siren, MASTER WARNING, cabin pressurization RED Light and the Oxygen
masks dropped and they thought it was the Takeoff Configuration
Warning (Were you on the runway, you IDIOT!!) and the Capt called
Maintenance Control and was out of his seat busily trying to pull
the C/B to silence the horn. The FO didn't speak his
language (German) and neither of them spoke English enough to
communicate with each other; but, hey, I'll bet they worked CHEAP
!!!
Cockpit Confusion Found in Crash of Cypriot Plane
By DON PHILLIPS, "International Herald Tribune"
Published: September 7, 2005
PARIS, Sept. 6 - The crew members of a Cypriot
airliner that crashed Aug. 14 near Athens became confused by a
series of alarms as the plane climbed, failing to recognize that the
cabin was not pressurizing until they grew mentally disoriented
because of lack of oxygen and lost consciousness, according to
several people connected with the investigation into the crash.
Complicating the cockpit confusion, neither the
German pilot nor the young, inexperienced Cypriot co-pilot could
speak the same language fluently, and each had difficulty
understanding the other's English, the worldwide language of air
traffic control.
A total of 121 people were killed in the crash
after the plane climbed and flew on autopilot, circling near Athens
until one engine stopped running because of a lack of fuel. The
sudden imbalance of power, with only one engine operating, caused
the autopilot to disengage and the plane to begin to fall.
So far, the Greek authorities have hinted at
oxygen problems, but have not announced the full findings of
investigators. The people interviewed for this article agreed to
speak only on the condition that they not be identified because none
are official spokesmen for the investigation and because of
political sensitivities arising from a Cypriot plane's crashing in
Greece.
Investigators pieced together the story of the
crash from many sources. In the wreckage, they found the first solid
clues: the pressurization valve and an air outflow valve set
incorrectly. Air traffic control tapes provided information on the
confusion in the cockpit.
The plane had a sophisticated new flight data
recorder that provided a wealth of information. There were
maintenance records from the night before, and investigators
interviewed the mechanics who worked on the plane.
Among other things, the investigators determined
that the pilot was not in his seat because he was up trying to solve
a problem that turned out to be one of the lesser threats facing the
plane.
The plane that crashed, a Boeing 737-300,
underwent maintenance the night before. The maintenance crew
apparently left pressurization controller rotary knob out of place,
according to the officials connected to the investigation, and the
crew did not catch the mistake during preflight checks the next day.
This meant that the plane could not pressurize properly.
At 10,000 feet, an alarm went off to warn the
crew that the plane would not pressurize. Crew members mistakenly
thought that the alarm horn was a warning to tell them that their
controls were not set properly for takeoff, the officials said.
The same horn is used for both conditions,
although it will sound for takeoff configuration only while the
plane is still on the ground.
The climb continued on autopilot. At 14,000 feet,
oxygen masks deployed as designed, and a master caution light
illuminated in the cockpit. Another alarm sounded at about the same
time on an unrelated matter, warning that there was insufficient
cooling air in the compartment housing avionics equipment.
The radio tapes showed that this created
tremendous confusion in the cockpit. Normally, an aircraft cabin is
held at 8,000 feet pressure, so the crew at over 14,000 feet would
already be experiencing some disorientation because of a lack of
oxygen. During this time, the captain and co-pilot discovered that
they had no common language and that their English was not good
enough for the complicated technical conversation required to fix
the problem.
The crew members called the maintenance base in
Cyprus and were told that the circuit breaker to turn off the loud
new alarm was in a cabinet behind the captain. The captain got up
from his seat to look for the circuit breaker, apparently ignoring
the confused co-pilot.
As the plane continued to climb on autopilot, the
air grew so thin that the crew became seriously impaired. The
captain lost consciousness first on the floor of the cockpit,
followed by the co-pilot, who remained in his seat, according to the
officials.
The autopilot did as it was programmed to do,
flying the plane at 34,000 feet to Athens and entering a holding
pattern. It remained in a long circling pattern, shadowed by Greek
military jets, until fuel ran low and one engine quit.
Boeing, the maker of the plane, issued a notice
shortly after the crash to airlines that it would revise flight crew
training manuals to emphasize to crews that they must understand how
the various warning systems work and what to do about them.
The notice emphasizes that the takeoff
configuration warning horn will not sound under any circumstances
after the plane has left the ground. The same horn will then be
used only for a cabin altitude warning. The company notice said
there had been other instances of confusion over the horn by pilots.
"Confusion between the cabin altitude warning
horn and the takeoff configuration warning horn can be resolved if
the crew remembers that the takeoff configuration warning horn is
only armed when the airplane is on the ground," the notice said. "If
this horn is activated in flight, it indicates that the cabin
altitude has reached 10,000 feet."
(See attached file: helios 1.jpg through helios
5.jpg)
-----
Addendum from John:
To be honest, I am INSULTED to think two pilots
who were in my previous line of work could be as cumulatively STUPID
as these two were! So what if they couldn't communicate with each
other? They demonstrated that they were incapable of THINKING in
the first place! Talking was not their biggest problem. They
were an embarrassment to professional pilots everywhere. I think
they should both be entered in this year's 'Darwin Awards'
competition. They've got a fair chance of winning. Unfortunately,
while doing their noble part to cleanse the gene pool, they had to
take quite a few innocents with them! That's the very sad part.
Just for the record and to make things crystal
clear, the pilots have an oxygen system which is *entirely* separate
and a completely different design than the oxygen system which is
provided for passengers and flight attendants. In addition, flight
attendants have access to portable, emergency, oxygen bottles,
located around the cabin in various lockers to be used, for example,
when fighting fires and smoke.
So, here's what I think happened: The bottom
line is that the pilots (using no supplemental oxygen at any time)
probably lapsed into unconsciousness first. Then the passengers
would follow 30 minutes later, since that is the certified amount of
time their kind of masks will provide oxygen. Finally, the flight
attendants would be last, since they would have supplemental oxygen
bottles to breathe from after their 'passenger-style' oxygen was all
used up. All three categories would, in order, simply lapse into
unconsciousness, like fainting or going to sleep at some point.
Some minutes later - while still unconscious - their hearts would
simply give out due to oxygen deprivation - and die *painlessly*,
since they were still "asleep" in a manner of speaking. Hours would
pass while the fuel was all used up. Though the plane certainly
made a loud bang and a big hole when it hit the ground, all the
people inside had died a long time earlier. And there would be
little or no fire.
When I first heard about this event and before
reading or hearing about any published accident investigation
results, establishing the cause of the accident, which this article
does now, I guessed the *only* way both pilots could be
incapacitated, via hypoxia - lack of oxygen - would be if the First
Officer/Copilot *failed* to manually open the oxygen bottle's valve
prior to flight as he is certainly supposed to do. This oxygen
bottle is located on his side, the extreme right side of the cockpit
and far away from the Captain's visual or manual access. Otherwise,
if the oxygen bottle valve *was* open, even if one pilot somehow
screwed up during some pressurization emergency, the other would
still continue to have access to oxygen - and remain alive - and fly
the plane. That's why I felt the valve being closed was the only
answer. Even the exotic idea of a terrorist smuggling a nerve gas
agent onto the airplane, say in a hair spray can, and discharging
same likely wouldn't work. Some passenger cabin air IS
recirculated, but only back into the passenger cabin, not into the
cockpit. The cockpit gets "new" air in almost all cases, unless
that -300 model is different than other 737's.
Of course, in addition to that setup
scenario-fault, a pressurization problem would also have to
occur. If a rapid, high altitude depressurization took place (very
rare, but possible), and if both pilots *believed* the valve had
been opened - as it should have, they might then don their masks and
righteously *assume* they were getting oxygen, but in fact were
not. Without the valve open, they were getting only ambient air -
at ambient (high altitude) air pressure into their oxygen masks.
That is useless and won't sustain consciousness - or life - at
35,000 feet. At that altitude, you might have 30 seconds of useful
consciousness - or even much less, depending upon your age and
fitness and the rate of depressurization. IF neither of the pilots
discovered in that short amount of time they were *not* getting
oxygen for some reason - and retained the presence of mind to check
(and then open) the valve on the bottle, they're cooked. Toast.
End of story.
Even that scenario is a bit of a stretch for
multiple reasons; not least of which because the default "standby"
switch position on each pilot's Oxygen Control Panel is always to
have 100% oxygen selected (as opposed to a mixture of oxygen and
ambient air, as necessary and the percentage of which depends upon
measured cabin altitude.) With oxygen panel controls (a separate
one exists for each pilot) set properly, if the oxygen valve itself
were *closed*, each pilot would not be able to 'draw' or breathe air
while their oxygen masks were on. The mask would be sealed and
nothing would get in; even ambient air. In the event of a
pressurization emergency, the first pilot to get his mask on would
instantly start yelling about 'opening that damned valve!' as their
automatic response. In any case, each mask *should* be tested on
the ground, prior to a flight. That also would be another huge
'clue' to the pilots that the valve was still closed. So, the only
theoretical explanation I could conjur to explain what happened
seemed flawed, too.
It never occured to me that another plausible
reason could exist - since pilots would catch any other kind of
failure, wouldn't they?
But, obviously, a valve left closed was *not* THE
cause in this case. The 'setup' for the accident was faulty
maintenance. O.K. That happens - and is not all that rare.
Pressurization problems happen. Maintenance people sometimes make
mistakes, but the pilots are paid well to detect and correct such
errors in 'real time' - at any time. It so happens that I had an
extremely similar thing happen to me when taking off from Los
Angeles one day. As I was passing through about 5,000 feet, I
somehow "sensed" that the aircraft was not pressurizing properly.
I'm no genius or clairvoyant, so I'm not bragging, but it just
didn't "feel" right, so I looked up at the cabin pressurization
gauges overhead and saw the cabin altitude was the same as our
aircraft's altitude; and there was no pressure differential
building between inside and outside of the aircraft. So, I
immediately requested a 'level off' altitude at 5,000 feet. The
Altitude Warning Horn never got to sound off. No red lights lit.
No masks dropped. No emergency took place. We took action *before*
reaching 10,000 feet! We cruised around off shore, talked with our
Los Angeles maintenance people, took some corrective actions to
correct a maintenance screwup, and the plane started pressurizing as
it was supposed to. And we then climbed and flew on to our
destination. No biggie. I doubt our passengers ever knew anything
was going on.
The pilots are the "last line of defense" against
(among other things) stupidity and human error, starting with those
of other people, but including 'trapping' their own errors before
they become serious problems. The TRUE cause of the accident was
that *both* pilots were brain-dead STUPID. They didn't understand
how their aircraft works, what the warning systems were trying to
tell them, and did not perform their essential function!! They
started working on the solution before they really had identified
the problem! Egad! I wonder how they ever completed transition
training to fly that aircraft - and how the Captain ever passed his
"Type Rating" checkride, to fly as Pilot-in-Command of that type of
aircraft!!!
It doesn't matter what model of jet aircraft you
fly; ANY TIME you hear the cabin altitude warning go off
(regardless of what kind of sound and/or warning lights turn on),
EVERY emergency checklist is going to have as it's first, #1
Action: "Put on your oxygen mask." Period. Everything else is
secondary!! We are all trained, just like Pavlov Dogs, to react
instantly and without any decision-making at all required when
certain, critical things, like that, occur. It never dawned on
either of them that they NEEDED oxygen. Duh! Where was *their*
training?
Yes, the horn used to warn the pilots about not
having their flaps, speed brakes, wheel brakes, and a few other
things set "properly" for takeoff - is the same one that is used to
warn the pilots that the cabin altitude is too high (meaning that
air pressure is too low) when such a condition is sensed by the
aircraft's pressure sensors. But that is NO excuse for this level
of confusion. If it's a "Takeoff Warning" the intermittent horn is
trying to alert, that kind of problem will *only* occur on the
ground. At which time, the pilots are supposed to do certain
things. But if it's a "cabin altitude" problem, (which is to say a
pressurization fault) they are supposed to do different things.
Pressurization problems can only take place while airborne and will
*never* take place on the ground. BUT you'd have to be a complete
IDIOT to confuse the two, different, possible meanings that one horn
is trying to tell you (as the article points out.)
But I still find it impossible to believe that
the pilots would be able to continue climbing to such an altitude to
where they'd lose consciousness (somewhat above 20,000' I assume,
which would take several minutes to reach) AFTER their first
warning, when the plane climbed through 10,000 feet. Doing a 'Wild
Goose Chase' around the cockpit, pursuing bogus 'faults' and pulling
circuit breakers should certainly stop, if not sooner, at least at
14,000! I'll tell you why.
The pilots can *command* the passenger oxygen
masks to drop at any time they choose; even while on the ground!
Just throw one switch and it'll happen. Regardless of that, if the
cabin altitude gets to 14,000 feet, the masks will drop
*automatically* in the passenger cabin, due to an
automatic, built-in pressure sensor set to trigger then. (Nothing
extra happens in the cockpit as they pass that altitude.) The very
next thing that will happen in the Real World is that the flight
attendant/stewardess is going to be wildly dinging the cockpit crew
with the interphone chime to find out just what the hell is going on
and why did the masks all dropped, and what the pilots are doing
about it, and do they want their coffee now? When the F/A tells the
Captain that the masks have all dumped in the back of the aircraft,
even a MONGOLOID Captain would then know he's got a serious
pressurization problem, not some 'takeoff warning' that won't shut
off!
For that matter, the Captain could have easily
trouble-shot the probem to confirm which reason the horning was
going off - by pressing one button. The 'Altitude Warning' horn
*can be silenced* by pressing a 'cutoff' button on the overhead
panel. But that button has no effect on a 'takeoff warning'. The
only way to silence a 'takeoff warning' horn is by fixing the
source of the problem.
I never believed a crew could be SO ignorant as
to ignore a RED 'Cabin Altitude' emergency annunciator light, assume
a cabin altitude horn is malfunctioning, and to ignore or fail to
check the Pressure Differential, Cabin Altitude, AND the altitude
Rate-of-Change gauges, which are pneumatic, direct-reading, and bona
fide 'no shit' gauges that ALWAYS work, and always tell the truth,
even without electrical power!
This German (an ethnic group with a well-deserved
reputation for engineering and scientific intelligence) and his ESL
Co-Star hit a new cumulative low on the I.Q. scale. I'm just sorry
that all those people had to be with them when the pilots left their
brains at home that day.
JRL
