Fare Wars: The ‘Friendly Skies’ Are More Cutthroat Than Ever
The
always-cyclical airline industry is passing through a
particularly rocky time as established carriers – hit hard by
recession, terrorism, SARS, war and now skyrocketing fuel costs
– face tough competition from a new generation of low-cost
airlines.
With most
large carriers expected to lose money this year, the spike in
airline-fuel costs that touched 13-year highs in May will add an
extra $2.5 billion in additional expenses, according to the Air
Transport Association. In response, several companies tried to
attach a fuel surcharge, but with continued weak demand and
fierce competition, the increases didn’t stick. “The rise in
airline fuel costs is a killer for airlines. We haven’t seen
anything like this in a long time,” says
Elizabeth Bailey, chair of Wharton’s business and public
policy department.
The hike in
fuel prices is just the latest problem to hit the industry. The
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks devastated companies’ already
lackluster balance sheets, and travelers are still reluctant to
fly, particularly when faced with delays due to new security
measures, Bailey says. For a time, airlines were able to
underwrite some of the domestic fall-off with international
business, but those revenues took a hit with the SARS virus and
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The collapse of a terminal at
Charles de Gaulle Airport near
Paris
last month
is yet another blow. “You sock it to them and they think they
can recover,” she says. “Then comes the next sock, and the next
sock, and the next sock.”
Many major
carriers reported losses in 2003. American, Delta, Northwest,
United and US Airways have negative, or very little shareholder
equity, according to
W.
Bruce Allen, a Wharton professor of business and public
policy. “These guys are just in awful shape,” he says. “That was
also true for most of them in 2001 and 2002.”
Robert Mittelstaedt, vice dean of executive education at
Wharton, says business travelers who once paid a premium to fly
have cut back on travel or are shopping for discounts and using
low-cost carriers. He also says executives are increasingly
abandoning scheduled airlines to travel on corporate jets,
including fractionally-owned aircraft in which companies share
access to a plane, similar to a vacation time-share. “A big
chunk of the price insensitive market has gone away as more and
more companies have access to airplane time,” he notes. “The
customers who wanted a higher level of service have left the
industry so the established airlines are left with the
price-sensitive market.”
Against this
backdrop, the airlines are also facing fierce new competition
from low-cost carriers, such as Texas-based Southwest, which
have grown to the point where they can offer customers
convenient travel schedules and low prices, says Robert W. Mann,
president of an independent consulting firm in Port Washington,
N.Y. “We have passed the tipping point where there are now
sufficient low-cost alternatives to inefficient network
services.”
Henry
Oechler, an aviation specialist at the
New York
law firm
Chadbourne & Parke, says Sept. 11 altered the whole structure of
the airline industry. “It allowed the low-cost carriers, which
were in their nascent stages, to become more ascendant.”
Meanwhile, large carriers are weighed down by restrictive work
rules that make it hard for them to compete with the new breed,
even as they are attempting to rewrite labor agreements either
through negotiations or in the bankruptcy courts. The new
entrants have made workers at the more established carriers more
willing to believe their employers are in serious danger of
going out of business. “In a showdown, pilots will now blink,”
Oechler says
The Hub’s
the Rub
Another part
of the established carriers’ business model that has been
challenged is the hub-and-spoke system, in which passengers from
smaller cities are consolidated at airline “hubs,” then
dispatched to their next destination. The idea was to provide a
cost-effective way to reach smaller markets and provide
convenient scheduling for passengers, even though it meant
changing planes.
Allen says
airlines fine-tuned their schedules to limit passenger layovers.
“The difficulty was that the minute it rained, the system got
screwed up because every plane depended on another plane.” With
increasing affluence and population growth, he adds, even
smaller markets can now generate enough business to sustain
point-to-point service, particularly for new low-cost airlines
using regional jets and paying pilots lower salaries.
According to
Wharton real estate professor Todd Sinai, who has researched
delays at hub airports, the system is expensive because it
requires airlines to hire large staffs to manage peak travel
times even though the staffing level is not necessary at other
times of the day. “The planes come in waves,” he says. “So you
need lots of baggage handlers to load the bags and lots of gate
agents – all at the same time.”
Bailey
points to other fall-out from the hub-and-spoke system: As major
airlines over-expanded at hub airports in the 1990s, they ended
up with excess gates, which are now being subleased by low-cost
carriers at bargain prices. This makes it even harder for larger
carriers to compete. Low-cost carriers are also finding good
prices on excess aircraft. “A lot of the new low-fare carriers
are buying planes very cheaply and have found space at airports”
that is newly-renovated and inexpensive, she says. “Meanwhile
the old established carriers are stuck servicing debt on both of
those kinds of capital expenditures. The low-fare guys are
looking good. Part of it is they are able to take advantage of
mistakes their bigger sister carriers made a decade ago.”
The
advantage of a hub system breaks down, Sinai adds, if low-cost
airlines poach profitable runs, such as coast-to-coast routes,
which help subsidize the bigger airlines’ service to smaller
markets. He predicts the hub system will change, but not
disappear completely. “A lot of people are predicting the doom
of the hub system. I think it’s going to be more of a shake-out
period.”
Adam
Pilarski, senior vice president of Avitas, a consulting firm in
Chantilly, Va., says the major airlines’ pricing structure is
also encouraging customers to defect to low-cost carriers. In
the 1990s, airlines set pricing based on yield management
techniques, which allotted a portion of each flight for deep
discount tickets sold to travelers willing to buy early and live
with certain restrictions. Last-minute travelers, often on
business, paid premium fares. “These were almost capricious
amounts – at least the flying public saw it like this,” says
Pilarski, adding that low-cost carriers such as Southwest and
JetBlue have diminished much of the disparity. “The multiples
aren’t so huge. You always feel bad when the person sitting next
to you paid half what you did. You feel taken advantage of.”
Pilarski
notes that pricing is just one element of service problems at
the large carriers, which, he suggests, “have to learn how to
treat people like customers. You get on JetBlue or Southwest and
you feel you are welcome there. On United you feel like you’re
imposing on them. You don’t survive in a service industry with
that attitude.”
Airlines
dominating a city usually jack up fares to compensate for lower
prices in competitive markets, Mittelstaedt adds, pointing to US
Airways in Philadelphia, Delta in Atlanta, American in Dallas
and United in Chicago. “Where you have a major single carrier
controlling a hub airport, fares are higher.” Again, Southwest
chose a different path. Even in airports where it has a strong
position, the company has kept fares within reason, says
Mittelstaedt. Southwest has been smart enough to build a model
that “ensures it will not attract competition.”
According to
Serquei Netessine,
Wharton professor of operations management, yield management is
not likely to disappear from the industry where it has become a
critical element of profitability. Low-cost carriers initially
charged flat fares but have begun to introduce some varying
ticket prices. “They are getting more sophisticated and my guess
is we will see their fare structure becoming more and more
complex.”
It is
difficult to determine how much yield management customers will
tolerate, he adds, noting Coca-Cola’s failed attempt to price
drinks in vending machines higher on warm days. “Customers
revolted,” he says. “So far, in airlines there is no revolt.
Consumers understand that an airline seat is worth nothing
tomorrow. It’s not like a book or a Coke that can be sold the
next day. So consumers tolerate this pricing.”
Netessine is
also examining how airlines price tickets and share revenue
within the growing number of airline alliances. Getting a
customer to fly multiple legs is more valuable to the allied
airlines. As a result, they want to provide discounts, but it is
often difficult to coordinate different prices when several
carriers are involved in the same ticket. Another pricing issue
that is emerging, he says, is how to package trips that include
airfare, hotels, rental cars and other amenities.
Airlines
within Airlines
While they
are looking good compared to some of their older rivals, the new
low-cost airlines are not without their own challenges. Mann
says JetBlue has been a success story so far, but that the
company is about to take on significant risk with the purchase
of new 100-seat aircraft to reach smaller markets where there
are high fixed costs. JetBlue may also have trouble finding
enough top-quality employees to support its expansion, he says.
“There literally is a limit to the number of people who are
going to deliver that spectacular level of customer service
every time.”
He predicts
Song, Delta’s own low-fare airline, and Ted, a similar operation
run by United, will become “footnotes” within a year or two.
“The airline within an airline model has never worked. If you’re
going to fix the factory, fix the factory. Don’t create a
sideshow outside and say how beautiful it is. The most
consistent comment coming out of Song passengers is, ‘Why can’t
Delta be like this?’ If you need to fix Delta, fix Delta.”
Meanwhile,
Sir Richard Branson, owner of Virgin Atlantic, a low-cost
trans-Atlantic carrier, is attempting to start a U.S. airline,
but is blocked by U.S. regulations barring foreign ownership,
according to Mann. However, he adds, “there are rumblings that
something may change that would enable some kind of
U.S.-European Union détente [and] might provide a window for
Branson to jump through.”
Allen says
it is too early to declare JetBlue a success. “They are a young
carrier, their planes are new and they have yet to go through
the maintenance cycle. You look at Southwest. They have been
through it all and there they are.” But even Southwest, he says,
is seeing its costs inch up. The company recently announced an
early-retirement package for employees in an effort to reduce
costs.
As it
expands into larger cities, such as
Philadelphia
where it is
now locked in a battle with US Airways, Southwest could face
troublesome delays, Allen notes, adding that Southwest’s
productivity is tied to its ability to turn its planes around
quickly and keep them earning money in the air. “The Southwest
guys are smart, but you get into
Philadelphia
and the
question is, ‘How do you avoid the delays along the East Coast
in general?’ Their secret even in Podunkville was to turn the
plane around in 20 to 25 minutes. The difficulty in a big city
is even if you can turn the plane around, you can sit out there
on the tarmac.”
Another
potential issue for Southwest is the decision last year by its
mechanics to leave the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and sign up with the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association, a
union with a feisty reputation. The current mechanics contract
extends through 2005. “The mechanics are interesting,” says
Allen. “If you’re a pilot and suddenly you’re not a pilot
anymore, what are you? But the mechanics are highly skilled and
there are a lot of places they could go. They are the scary guys
in terms of being able to control the carrier.” Southwest has
also had some problems with its flight attendants, Allen adds.
Last year they staged informational pickets arguing that they
work an extra 300 hours a year without pay cleaning up Southwest
planes. “When it comes to Southwest,” says Allen, “the
interesting question is, ‘Can they – as they have in the past –
maintain their esprit de corps?’”
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